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In this paper, we make an exploratory use of numerical techniques (genetic algorithms and Monte
Carlo simulations) to compute eﬃcient and emergent networks in a spatialized version of the con-
nections model of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). This approach allows us to observe and discuss the
coordination failures that arise in a strategic network formation context with link-mediated positive
externalities to connections and geographically based connection costs. Our results highlight that,
depending on the strength of the externalities, emergent and eﬃcient networks may share several
structural properties. Nevertheless, emergent networks have too few local and distant connections
and are also too less “coordinated” around some central agents than they should.
Keywords: Strategic Network Formation; Eﬃciency; Stability; Coordination; Small Worlds; Ge-
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JEL codes: D85, C63, D62, Z131 Introduction
In the last decade, networks structure characterization has been the object of a high and growing
interest in various ﬁelds. Much eﬀort have been dedicated to understand the topology of real networks.
More recently, some studies concentrate on the dynamic processes that determine such topologies. In
economics, some authors, recognizing that both individual and collective behaviors and performances
are grounded in networks, focus on the micro-behaviors that drive network formation. In the ACE
literature, the emergent properties of networks have been studied by Kirman and Vriend (2001) and
Tesfatsion (1997) who model the formation of trade networks among strategically interacting buyers
and sellers. These agents choose their partners adaptively, on the base of their past experiences with
these partners 1,2. The aim of such computational approaches is to study complex dynamic systems
of interacting agents.
A more theoretical and analytical economic literature on network formation builds upon the sem-
inal contributions of Aumann and Myerson (1988) and of Jackson and Wolinski (1996). Two main
questions are central in this literature (Jackson, 2004): Which networks are likely to form when
agents choose their connections in order to maximize given individual payoﬀs structures? And how
eﬃcient are networks that emerge from self-interested agents’ choices? The ﬁrst stylized economic
model that tackles those two questions is the so-called connections model introduced by Jackson
and Wolinski (1996). The very simple and realistic speciﬁcation of the individual payoﬀs allows the
authors to obtain systematic analytical results on graphs eﬃciency and partial on networks stability.
This allows them to show that often eﬃcient networks are unstable. More recently two articles have
extended this model in order to study the dynamics of network emergence (see Watts (2001) for de-
terministic dynamics and Jackson and Watts (2002) for stochastic dynamics). In those contributions,
the analytical computation of (possibly numerous) emerging networks becomes diﬃcult to handle.
More generally, this literature faces important diﬃculties to generate and discuss non trivial network
conﬁgurations. Indeed, network structures they analyze are very simple (complete network, empty
network, complete star) and have little in common with real social or economic networks. Some
frequent features of real social networks are short average distance between agents, high clustering
(i.e. there is a high probability that two agents to be neighbors if they have neighbors in common)
and heterogenous neighborhood sizes among agents (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Albert and Barab´ asi,
1999). These properties altogether characterize the so-called Small World phenomenon3.
Very recently, Carayol and Roux (2003) and Jackson and Rogers (2005) propose variations of the
connections model by giving diﬀerent forms of geographic locations to individuals and introducing
complexities in individual payoﬀ functions through spatial costs of direct link formation4. Their aim
is to ﬁnd the minimal speciﬁcations that lead to emerging networks that are much richer and that tend
to correspond to those empirically observed social networks. In their spatialized connections model,
Carayol and Roux (2003) obtain, in a dynamic setting and for a wide set of parameters, endogenous
networks that exhibit the Small World properties (i.e. highly clustered connection structures and
1For a survey on ACE models studying network formation, one can refer to Tesfatsion (2003).
2A similar approach is also used by Dupo¨ et and Yıldızo˘ glu (2005) for studying the emergence of a particular type
of network: communities of practice.
3Evidences concern for instance networks of ﬁrm board members (Davis and Greve, 1996), or networks of scientiﬁc
papers co-authorship (Barab´ asi et al., 2001; Newman, 2001).
4Johnson and Gilles (2000) ﬁrst introduced such spatialized connections model with linear geographical distance.
1short average path length). We call emergent networks these connection structures since they
endogenously result from the connection establishment mechanism assumed in this setup5. Carayol
and Roux also observe that, for certain values of the parameters, emergent networks are globally and
locally too weakly connected since the agents don’t want to individually support the costs of social
welfare improvement. Nevertheless, their results are limited and partial since, even for a relatively
small set of agents, it becomes very diﬃcult to compute network eﬃciency both analytically and
numerically6. Indeed, one cannot appreciate the extent to which emerging networks are eﬃcient and
whether they are structurally diﬀerent from the optimal networks. Carayol, Roux and Yıldızo˘ glu
(2005) propose to use Genetic Algorithm (GA) techniques to compute eﬃcient networks. They
test and calibrate this technique on two simple models among which the connections model7 (for
which the eﬃcient networks are fully known) and show that the proposed method is quite robust for
computing the eﬃcient networks in these models.
In the present paper, we make an exploratory use of such technique to compute the eﬃcient
networks in the spatialized connections model. This allows us to compare for the ﬁrst time the (GA)
eﬃcient networks to the emergent networks in this model. Thus we can fully discuss the coordination
failures that may arise in the network formation context. Our aim is to provide a general method
for exploring the eﬃcient and equilibrium networks. The results of this exploration should be very
useful to any ACE model that contains a network formation component. The modeler can get some
precious insights on the possible results of his/her model and on the consequences of the diﬀerent
assumptions on network formation. In our context, we show for example that the emergent networks
are less dense than the ones that maximizes social wealth. This clearly corresponds to the economic
intuition: because agents beneﬁt from indirect connections, there are positive indirect externalities to
bond formation. Therefore agents naturally build less links than they should. Moreover the emergent
networks are found to be less “coordinated” than they should. Indeed the supplement of connections
observed in the eﬃcient networks is preferentially attributed to one or several agents who have central
positions in the networks. These connections allow a more eﬃcient distribution of wealth among all
agents. Emergent networks do not share such structural property because agents do not want to
play a central and costly position. Agents would beneﬁt from mutualizing the costs for increasing
the connectivity of one (or several) of them so as to enhance the quality of the indirect connections
in the network. Our results underline the diﬃculties of coordination in strategic network formation
and the necessity of public policies (when they are possible) in order to sustain the emergence of
central agents in networks.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section begins with some basic deﬁnitions on
network formation literature and presents the variant of the connections model developed in Carayol
and Roux (2003) and their approach for computing emergent networks in a dynamic setting. Section
3 synthetically presents the Genetic Algorithms approach developed in Carayol, Roux and Yıldızo˘ glu
(2005) and its performance in determining eﬃcient networks. Section 4 compares the emergent and
5This concept should not be confused with the concept of emergence used in the Complex Adaptive System literature,
as well as in the ACE approach.
6Even for a relatively small numbers of players, the number of possible networks becomes very large. Johnson and
Gilles (2000) observe that the number of possible networks for n agents is
￿c(n,2)
k=1 c(c(n,2),k) + 1 where, for every
k 5 n, c(n,k) := n!/(k!(n − k)!). For example, when n = 8, the number of possible networks exceeds 250 million.
7The other one is the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
2the eﬃcient networks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Network formation: the model
In this section, we begin by introducing the notation and the basic notions for studying networks and
their eﬃciency. We limit our attention to the case of non-directed graphs, where bonds are symmetric
and built on mutual consent, as it occurs in many real social networks. Then, we introduce the
dynamic pertubated process that leads to network formation. Finally, we present the model.
2.1 Basic notions on graphs
We consider a ﬁxed and ﬁnite set of n agents, N = {1,2,...,n} with n ≥ 3. Let i and j be two
members of this set. Agents are represented by the nodes of a non-directed graph, which’s edges
represent the links between them. The graph constitutes the relational network between the agents.
A link between two distinct agents i and j ∈ N is denoted ij. A graph g is a list of unordered
pairs of connected and distinct agents. Formally, {ij} ∈ g means that the link ij exists in g. We
deﬁne the complete graph gN = {ij | i,j ∈ N} as the set of all subsets of N of size 2, where all




as the ﬁnite set of all possible graphs between the n agents.
Then for any g, we deﬁne N(g) = {i | ∃j : ij ∈ g}, the set of agents who have at least one link in
the network g. We also deﬁne Ni(g) as the set of neighbors agent i has, that is: Ni(g) = {j | ij ∈ g}.
The cardinal of that set ηi(g) = #Ni(g) is called the degree of node i. The total number of links in




A path connecting i to j in a non empty graph g ∈ G, is a sequence of edges between distinct
agents such that {i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik} ⊂ g where i1 = i, ik = j. The length of a path is the number
of edges it contains. Let i ←→g j be the set of paths connecting i and j on the graph g. The set of
shortest paths between i and j on g noted ig ←→gj is such that ∀k ∈ ig ←→gj, we have k ∈ i ←→g j and
#k = minh∈i←→gj #h. We deﬁne the geodesic distance between two agents i and j as the number of
links of the shortest path between them: d(i,j) = dg(i,j) = #k, with k ∈ ig ←→gj. When there is no
path between i and j, their geodesic distance is conventionally inﬁnite: d(i,j) = ∞. A graph g ⊆ gN
is said to be connected if there exists a path between any two vertices of g.
An external metrics can also be introduced, representing for example the geographic position of
agents (Johnson and Gilles, 2000). Such external metrics deﬁnes a new distance operator denoted
d0(i,j). Following Carayol and Roux (2003), we consider further that agents are located on a circle
(or a ring). Without loss of generality, agents are ordered according to their index, such that i
is the immediate geographic neighbor of agent i + 1 and agent i − 1 but agent 1 and agent n
who are neighbors. As a consequence, the geographic distance between any two agents is given by
d0(i,j) = min{|i − j|;n − |i − j|}.
Several typical graphs can be described. Let i 6= j ∈ N. First of all, the empty graph, denoted g∅,
is such that it does not contain any links. The ring g
◦
is a regular network of order k = 1, in which
all agents are connected and only connected with their two closest geographic neighbors. Finally, a
(complete) star, denoted g?, is such that #g? = n − 1 and there exists an agent i ∈ N such that if
jk ∈ g?, then either j = i or k = i. Agent i is called the center of the star. It should be noted that
3there are n possible stars, since every node can be the center.
2.2 Value and eﬃciency of networks
Traditionally in economics, eﬃciency refers to a state from which no agent’s payoﬀs can be improved
without deteriorating the payoﬀ of at least one other agent. In the context of network eﬃciency,
this property, which corresponds to the Pareto eﬃciency, means that a network is eﬃcient when it
does not exist another network that leads to a higher payoﬀ for at least one individual, without
deteriorating the payoﬀ of other agents. Since the pioneering work of Jackson and Wolinski (1996),
a ‘strongest’ notion of eﬃciency is preferred in the economic literature on networks formation.
Let πi (g) be the net individual payoﬀ that the agent i receives from maintaining his position in
the network g, with πi :
￿
g | g ⊆ gN￿
→ <. The network social value, denoted π (·), can be computed




A network is then said to be eﬃcient if it maximizes this sum. The formal deﬁnition follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A network g ⊆ gN is said to be eﬃcient if it maximizes the value function π(g) on the
set of all possible graphs
￿
g | g ⊆ gN￿
i.e. π(g) ≥ π(g0) for all g0 ⊆ gN.
It should be noticed that several networks can lead to the same maximal total value. For example,
if we consider strictly homogenous agents, any isomorphic graph of an eﬃcient network is also eﬃcient.
2.3 Network formation: pairwise stability and dynamics
We turn now toward the stability of graphs. Jackson and Wolinski (1996) introduce the notion of
pairwise stability which departs from the Nash equilibrium since the process of network formation is
both cooperative and non cooperative. In such a process, the formation of a link between two agents
requires the consent of both of them, but not its deletion, which can unilaterally emanate from one
of them. The formal deﬁnition of this notion is the following.
Deﬁnition 2 A network g ⊆ gN is said to be pairwise stable if:
i) for all ij ∈ g, πi(g) ≥ πi(g − ij) and πj(g) ≥ πj(g − ij), and
ii) for all ij / ∈ g, if πi(g + ij) > πi(g) then πj(g + ij) < πj(g).
In the present paper we are interested in the dynamic network formation presented in Jackson and
Watts (2002) which is consistent and encompasses the stability notion presented above. It roughly
corresponds to the following scheme. At each period, two agents i,j ∈ N are randomly chosen
with the same probability pt
ij = pt > 0. They can decide to form, maintain or break links. Let’s
assume that agents are myopic: they take their decisions on the basis of the immediate impact of
links on their current payoﬀs. If these agents are already connected, they consider whether they may
unilaterally severe the link or bilaterally keep it. If they are not directly connected, they consider
whether they should add this connection or stay disconnected. Formally, the dynamic process can
be described as follows:
4i) if ij ∈ gt, the link is saved if and only if πi(gt) ≥ πi(gt − ij) and πj(gt) ≥ πj(gt − ij),
ii) if ij / ∈ gt, a link is created if and only if πi(gt + ij) ≥ πi(gt) and πj(gt + ij) ≥ πj(gt) with a
strict inequality for at least one of the two agents.
Following Jackson and Watts (2002), we then introduce small random perturbations ε which
invert agents’ right decisions in creating, maintaining or deleting links. These perturbations may be
understood as mistakes or as mutations. For small but non null values of ε, it can be shown that the
discrete-time Markov chain becomes irreductible and aperiodic and has thus a unique corresponding
stationary distribution (µε). Such perturbed stochastic processes are said to be ergodic. Intuitively
ergodicity implies that it is possible to transit directly or indirectly between any chosen pair of states
in a potentially very long period of time. It allows the long run state of the system to become
independent of its initial conditions.
Usually, the modeler let ε → 0 (once the long run is reached) in order to restrict the number of
states selected in the long run. State z is said to be a stochastically stable state (Young, 1993) if
it has a non null probability of occurrence in the stationary distribution: limε→0 µε(z) > 0. In the
network formation context, Jackson and Watts (2002) show that stochastically stable networks are
either pairwise stable or part of a closed cycle8 (of the unperturbed process). In practice the precise
computation of the stochastically stable networks requires the identiﬁcation of all the recurrent classes
of the unperturbed process (Young, 1998) which, in the network context, are likely to be extremely
numerous. Therefore we propose a slightly diﬀerent regime for the perturbation process. We let the
error term decrease in time according to the following simple rule:
εt =
(
ε if t < T
1/t otherwise
, (2)
with ε > 0 the initial noise and T some ﬁnite time. This rule ensures that the noise does aﬀect the
dynamics while it decreases down to zero when time increases with limt→∞ εt = 0. It also preserves the
ergodicity property of the system. Notice that this property is interesting since it renders numerical
experiments more tractable in order to examine with good conﬁdence the long run behavior of the
system (Vega-Redondo, 2005). Therefore we use Monte Carlo experiments to approximate the unique
limiting stationary distribution (of networks) of the perturbed dynamic process presented above. The
experiments are stopped at t = 10,000, date after which the process is proven to have almost surely
stabilized on a given pairwise stable state9. If not, the process still goes until it reaches one. Our
emergent networks10 hence correspond to the support of this limiting stationary distribution.
2.4 The spatialized “Connections Model”
In the Connections model introduced by Jackson and Wolinski (1996), links represent individuals’
relationships (for example, friendships). In such a context, agents beneﬁt from their direct and
indirect connections, through the relational network of their partners. But, the communication is not
perfect: the positive externality deteriorates with the relational distance of the connection. Formally,
8A closed cycle is a set of networks that may be reached from any one of them without errors and that cannot lead
to any other network.
9See Carayol and Roux (2003) for more precise time series analysis of the network formation process.
10This concept should not be confused with the concept of emergence used in the Complex Adaptive System literature,
as well as in the ACE approach.
5there is a decay parameter which represents the quality of links used for information ﬂows. Moreover,
agents bear costs for maintaining direct connections. As a consequence, agents try to maximize the
value generated from direct and indirect connections, avoiding superﬂuous connections. This simple
speciﬁcation of the individual payoﬀs allows the authors to obtain systematic analytical results on
graphs’ eﬃciency and partial results on networks’ stability. Nevertheless, the eﬃcient and stable
network structures they discuss are very simple (complete network, empty network, complete star)
and not very realistic.
In order to obtain emerging networks which tend to correspond to the empirically observed social
or economic networks, Carayol and Roux (2003) propose a variation of the connections model of
Jackson and Wolinski (1996), by giving geographic locations to individuals and introducing complex-
ities in individual payoﬀ functions through spatial costs for direct links formation. Let’s assume that









where d(i,j) is the geodesic distance between i and j. δ ∈ ]0;1[ is the decay parameter and δd(i,j)
gives the payoﬀs resulting from the (direct or indirect) connection between i and j. It is a decreasing
function of the geodesic distance since δ is less than unity. Notice that if there is no path between i
and j, then d(i,j) = ∞ and thus δd(i,j) = 0. The second part of the right-hand side of the equation
describes the costs of direct links. c ∈ ]0;1[ is a parameter which gives the costs that agents have
to bear for each of their direct connection. d0(i,j) gives the geographic distance between any two
agents on the external metrics (a circle) we consider. Thus costs increase linearly with the geographic
distance separating neighboring agents.
3 Eﬃcient networks: the Genetic Algorithms approach
Searching for eﬃcient network structures is in general a diﬃcult analytical task. But, once the pay-
oﬀ structure is well deﬁned in relation with the connection structure, one is tempted to explore this
question using more heuristic strategies. As a matter of fact, the connection structure of the network
can be expressed as a matrix of bits (1 for connection or 0 for absence of connection) and the pay-oﬀ
structure can assign a value to each of such matrices. The search for eﬃcient networks can hence
be seen as an optimization problem in the connection-matrix space, i.e. the space of all possible
networks. This optimization problem yields analytical solutions only for simple pay-oﬀ structures.
We examine here a numerical tool for optimization: genetic algorithms (GA) that have proved their
eﬃcacy in optimization problems where the potential solutions can be represented as binary strings.
Our networks can eﬀectively be quite easily represented as binary strings.
11Johnson and Gilles (2000), relying on Debreu’s (1969) hypothesis according to which closely located players incur
lower costs to sustain communications, ﬁrst introduced spatial costs for direct link formation with a linear geographical
distance. We thus obtain the same payoﬀs speciﬁcation as theirs with a circle as an external metrics instead of a line.
63.1 Representing networks as binary strings
Our problem is to ﬁnd the network g which maximizes social value π as given by the equation 1 over
the set of all possible networks G. In order to use the GA for this optimization problem, we need to
represent our networks as binary strings (sequences of bits – 1 or 0).
Consider ﬁrst that any network with n agents (whether directed or not, eventually with self-
connections) can, without loss of generality, be represented by a connection matrix of size n × n
of binary elements. Given that all networks we consider are undirected (i is connected to j iﬀ j
is also connected to i) and that self-connections are excluded, the upper triangular part of this
connection matrix, excluding the diagonal, provides complete information on the network structure.
As a consequence, the vector composed by all the connection bits of this upper triangular part in
some conventionally chosen order sums up the network structure. Thus for a network of n agents,





¿From the point of view of a genetic algorithm, undirected networks can hence be formally
represented as chromosomes deﬁned as sequences of binary elements: A = (a1,a2,...,al) with ai ∈
{0,1},∀i ∈ {1,2,...,l}.
In the example below with n = 3 agents, the undirected network g = {13,23} is fully characterized























 → A = (0,1,1)
Once we represent it, we can compute the value of a connection matrix (its ﬁtness) using the
equation 1 and utilize the Genetic Algorithms to search for matrices with the highest value.
3.2 Genetic Algorithms: How do they work?
Genetic algorithms (GA) are numerical optimization techniques developed by John Holland (see for
example Holland (2001), which has initially been published in 1975). GA transpose to other problems
the strategies that the biological evolution has successfully used for exploring complex ﬁtness land-
scapes. The search for an optimum by a GA corresponds to the evolution of a population of candidate
solutions through selection, crossover (combination) and mutation (random experiments). The GA
have been used for solving a very large set of problems directly, or indirectly as a component of a
7classiﬁer system. Goldberg (1991) gives quite an exhaustive account of the characteristics of the GA





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: A simple example of genetic algorithm
The canonical genetic algorithm makes evolve a population of binary strings (chromosomes com-
posed of 1 and 0). The size of the population m is given. It is the source of one of the strengths of the
GA: implicit parallelism (the exploration of the solution space using several candidates in parallel).
The population of chromosomes at step t (a generation) is denoted P(t) = {Aj}t with #P(t) = m,
and ∀t = 1,2...T with T the given total number of generations. Notice that T is the other source of
the strengths of the GA. The algorithm (randomly) generates an initial population P (0) of candidate
chromosomes which are evaluated at each period using the ﬁtness (value) function. They are used
for composing a new population at the next period P(t + 1). For illustrative purposes, Figure 1
gives a deliberately trivial example of optimization by GA. Each chromosome has a probability of
being selected that is increasing in its ﬁtness. The members included in the new population are
recombined using a crossover mechanism (see Figure 2). The crossover operation introduces con-
trolled innovations in the population since it combines the candidates already selected in order to
invent new candidates with a potentially better ﬁtness. Moreover, the mutation operator randomly
modiﬁes the candidates and introduces some random experimenting in order to more extensively
explore the state space and escape local optima. Typically, the probability of mutation is rather
low in comparison with the probability of crossover because otherwise the disruption introduced by
excessive mutations can destruct the hill-climbing capacity of the population. Finally, an elitism
operator can be used which ensures that the best individual of a population will be carried to the
next generation12.






















Figure 2: A simple example of crossover operation
4 Emergent and eﬃcient networks: coordination failures in net-
work formation
We present our research protocol in the next subsection. The second subsection exposes the ﬁrst
results on eﬃcient networks and the last one compares the emergent networks to GA eﬃcient net-
works.
4.1 Simulation protocol : Numerical settings, indicators and controls
The research protocol combines the techniques ﬁrst used and presented in Carayol and Roux (2003) for
generating emergent networks with Monte Carlo experiments and in Carayol, Roux and Yıldızo˘ glu
(2005) for computing eﬃcient networks with GA. Standard indicators are used for characterizing
their structures and thus comparing them. In order to allow unbiased comparisons (since the density
of the computed networks can introduce a bias), we correct these indicators using measures from
comparable (control) random networks.
4.1.1 Numerical settings
Our numerical experiments all correspond to n = 20 agents. For simpliﬁcation purposes, we consider
that the unit cost in the payoﬀ function (3) is ﬁxed as c =
2
n
(0.1 in our case). For the generation
of both the GA–eﬃcient networks and the emergent networks, all experiments are performed with
randomly drawn values of δ over the value space ]0,1[.
The ﬁrst series of experiments relate to the computation of the GA–eﬃcient networks. The Java
JGAP13 library is used to implement the GA based on binary chromosomes. The GA that we use is
elitist and its probabilities of crossover and mutation are both computed by JGAP14. Carayol, Roux
and Yıldızo˘ glu (2005) test the relevance of the GA as a search algorithm for eﬃcient networks in the
two stylized models for which the eﬃcient networks are known. It establishes the robustness of the
GA using an extensive set of Monte Carlo simulations. When n = 20, we know that the GA performs
correctly with a population of chromosomes of size m = 500 evolving over T = 500 generations. We
will use these numerical values in the present paper. A ﬁxed number (500) of random draws of δ are
performed in order to reasonably cover the parameter space (]0,1[). In this article, we slightly adapt
the simulation protocol in order to increase the robustness of our results. For each conﬁguration, we
now fully run three times the GA in order to obtain three ﬁnal candidate networks among which we
keep the one that generates the highest social value as the GA–eﬃcient network.
The second series of numerical experiments are designed to search the emerging networks (the
networks which are on the unique limiting stationary distribution of the perturbed dynamic process
13http://jgap.sourceforge.net/
14Probability of crossover is 0.5 and the probability of mutation is 1/15.
9of Jackson and Watts, 2002) developed in Section 2. We run 1,000 experiments with randomly drawn
values of δ ∈ ]0,1[. All experiments are stopped at t = 10,000, date after which the process is proven
to have almost surely stabilized on a given pairwise stable state.
4.1.2 Indicators
Several indicators are used in order to provide a synthetic characterization of the structural properties
of networks.
Density of network. We compute the density of the network as follows:
ˆ η(g) = η(g)/n. (4)
This indicator hence corresponds to the average degree in the network.
Average distance. (or Average Path Length) We compute the average distance of (directly or





j6=i d(i,j) × 1{i ↔g j 6= ∅}
#{ij |i 6= j,i ↔g j 6= ∅}
, (5)
with #{·} denoting the cardinal of the set deﬁned into brackets and 1{·}, the indicator function
that is equal to unity if the condition is veriﬁed and zero otherwise.
Average Clustering. (or Average Cliquishness as it is often referred to in the physics of networks
literature) The average clustering indicates to what extent the neighborhoods of connected








1{j,l ∈ Ni(g);j 6= l;j ∈ Nl(g)}
#{lj |j 6= l;j,l ∈ Ni(g)}
. (6)
It is the frequency with which agents’ neighbors are also neighbors together.
Next, we intend to know more on the distribution of neighborhoods size in the population.
Global asymmetry. It is computed using the diﬀerence between the largest neighborhood size and






This indicator measures the global asymmetry of neighborhood sizes in the network.
Last we are also interested in the extent of neighborhood asymmetry between directly connected
agents.
Local asymmetry. It is computed as the sum over all direct connections of the absolute value of






|ηi(g) − ηj(g)|. (8)
This indicator gives the propensity of the highly connected agents to be linked to agents that
have few connections. It can be understood as a measure of non assortativity of connections
as regard agents’ neighborhood sizes.
104.1.3 Controls for density
The last four indicators presented above are aﬀected by the density of the network (the ﬁrst indicator)
that is likely to vary with both δ and the generating process (GA or stochastic stability). Therefore,
these indicators are somehow biased and we must ﬁnd an eﬃcient control for density. We propose
to build, for each generated network, control random graphs which have exactly the same number
of agents and connections (thus the same density). Such networks are simply built by allocating
the given number of edges to randomly chosen pairs of agents15. For each given number of edges
and agents, the four above mentioned indicators are then numerically computed for 1,000 of such
randomly drawn networks. The average of the observations is used as the control value. For instance,







is the average global asymmetry of neighborhood sizes over a set of
1,000 random networks that have exactly the same density as g. Each of the indicators is corrected
using the corresponding ratio.
This method allows us (i) to analyze the structural properties of eﬃcient networks given their
density; (ii) to compare eﬃcient and emergent networks for the diﬀerent values of δ while controlling
for their density. The results are given in the following sections.
4.2 The structural properties of GA–eﬃcient networks
We ﬁnd that the GA–eﬃcient networks are globally only 6% longer than random graphs, and in an
intermediary region of δ values (δ ∈ [0.5,0.7]), they are even 3% shorter (see the ratio d(g)/d (grd)
in Table 1). This is noticeably low since, in random graphs, the average distance between any two
indirectly connected agents is already known to be very “short”. In the meantime, on the global
level (see the last column of Table 1), the clustering ratio of the eﬃcient networks is close to 2,
which means that eﬃcient networks are nearly twice clustered (94% more) than their controls (the
random networks). The conjunction of these two characteristics qualiﬁes the eﬃcient networks as
Small Worlds in the sense of Watts and Strogatz (1998), a property that many real networks do
share.
Proposition 1 When δ is neither close to 0 nor close to 1, eﬃcient networks have an average
distance (path length) similar to the one of the control random networks while they are signiﬁcantly
more clustered than these random networks. In this sense they correspond to Small Worlds.
As regard the two other indicators, an interesting contrast arises. The eﬃcient networks have
9% less global asymmetry of neighborhoods than their control random graphs, while they have 45%
more local asymmetry of neighborhoods. This indicates that, though the global asymmetry is quite
similar (slightly lower) to a case where the connections would be simply allocated at random, agents
with fewer links have a signiﬁcantly higher chance to be directly connected to agents who have many
connections.
Proposition 2 Eﬃcient networks tend to provide central positions to some agents in a similar extent
as random networks, but, in the ﬁrst case, these central agents are more likely to be connected to
agents with few links.
15In the random graphs literature, such networks are known as random graphs of the kind of Erd¨ os and R´ eny (1960).
11Ratios g \ δ 0.1 − 0.5 0.5 − 0.7 0.7 − 0.85 0.85 − 0.95 0.95 − 1 0.1 − 1
d(g) GA eﬃcient 1.19 (0.17) 0.97 (0.00) 0.94 (0.00) 0.90 (0.00) 1.21 (0.14) 1.06 (0.09)
d(grd) Emergent 1.51 (0.29) 1.01 (0.00) 1.01 (0.00) 1.10 (0.01) 1.86 (0.06) 1.23 (0.20)
c(g) GA eﬃcient 2.23 (1.64) 1.54 (0.03) 1.70 (0.09) 2.03 (0.54) 0.37 (0.35) 1.94 (0.91)
c(grd) Emergent 1.60 (1.86) 1.34 (0.01) 1.13 (0.09) 0.55 (0.28) 0.00 (0.00) 1.25 (1.07)
r(g) GA eﬃcient 0.64 (0.09) 0.75 (0.04) 1.09 (0.07) 2.10 (0.50) 2.10 (0.32) 0.91 (0.31)
r(grd) Emergent 0.24 (0.03) 0.40 (0.00) 0.50 (0.02) 0.54 (0.01) 0.58 (0.04) 0.37 (0.04)
u(g) GA eﬃcient 1.01 (0.24) 0.98 (0.12) 1.60 (0.36) 4.10 (6.87) 2.81 (1.43) 1.45 (1.80)
u(grd) Emergent 0.36 (0.07) 0.39 (0.01) 0.48 (0.02) 0.60 (0.02) 0.71 (0.10) 0.43 (0.06)
Table 1: Average values (and variance in parentheses) of the various indexes computed on GA–
eﬃcient networks and emergent networks relative to their control random networks drawn for various
regions of δ. The region for which δ < 0.1 is never taken into considerations because both eﬃcient
and emergent networks are empty and thus most indexes are not computable.
The most connected agents reduce the distance between all agents and thus contribute to increas-
ing of social wealth. The need for such global coordination is considerably high when δ ≈ 0.9, where
complete stars tend to become eﬃcient. The superiority of such networks in terms of social surplus
decreases sharply when delta becomes closer to 1, because the connections of various lengths tend to
provide the same wealth (the decay phenomenon becomes negligible).
Proposition 3 When δ ≈ 0.9, eﬃcient networks provide central positions to a few agents (or even




















GA Efficient / Random Emergent Networks
Figure 3: The density of GA–eﬃcient networks and emergent networks for the various values of δ.
124.3 Comparing emergent networks and eﬃcient networks
The ﬁrst series of results relate to networks density. Apart from the regions where δ is either close to
0 or close to 1, the density of selected stable networks is lower than the density of eﬃcient networks
(see Figure 3). Agents generate less connections than they should as regard social surplus. This
clearly conﬁrms the economic intuition that arises from the basic payoﬀ function of the connections
model: there are positive externalities to link formation since his neighbors, and potentially all agents
to whom a given agent is directly and indirectly connected, may beneﬁt from any new connections
that this agent would establish. Therefore, it is not surprising that selﬁsh agents, who do not take
into account the social returns of link formation, establish too few connections.
Proposition 4 When δ is neither close to 0 nor close to 1, the density of emergent networks is lower
































GA Efficient / Random Emergent / Random
Figure 4: The average distance d(·) of GA–eﬃcient networks and emergent networks for the various
values of δ relative to the average distance of their control random networks
The relational distances (see Figure 4) between agents in the network constitute key factors for
wealth generation since they directly intervene in the payoﬀ function. We ﬁnd that such distances
are in average signiﬁcantly longer (controlling for density) in selected stable networks than in eﬃcient
networks, when δ is either low16 or high (when δ . 0.45 or δ & 0.80 see Figure 4 and Table 1). In
these extreme regions of δ, agents do not generate (geographically) long distance costly shortcuts.
When δ is low, the rewards of such connections are too low as regard the costs. When δ is high,
the diﬀerence between rewards from (relational) shorter and longer connections become too low as
compared to the costs. It is only for intermediary regions of δ that agents are provided with nearly
16This indicator is not deﬁned when δ is lower than 0.1, that is when the network is empty.
13suﬃcient incentives to bear the costs associated with long distance connections. In particular, for
δ ∈ [0.5,0.7] the emergent networks are in average only 1% longer than control random graphs while
eﬃcient networks are slightly shorter than their own control random graphs.
Proposition 5 While the average distance of emergent networks is globally longer than the one of
eﬃcient networks, there is an intermediary region of δ ([0.5,0.7]) for which the average distance of






























GA Efficient / Random Emergent / Random
Figure 5: The average cliquishness (clustering) c(·) of GA–eﬃcient networks and emergent networks
for the various values of δ relative to the average distance of their control random networks.
What does the payoﬀ function of the spacialized connection model imply in terms of clustering?
Except for extreme values of δ, there is no simple answer to this question. On the one hand,
the connections model provides positive externalities that are conveyed through the network: agents
beneﬁt from other agents with whom they are indirectly connected. Such externalities are the highest
at distance 2. Thus agents have low incentives to form triangles (which increase clustering), that
is to connect to those agents whom they already beneﬁt from. This is particularly true when δ is
far from 0.5 (that is when δ − δ2 decreases) holding constant the costs of link formation17.On the
other hand, such positive externalities also provide agents with incentives to form triangles in order
to beneﬁt more from these agents whom they already beneﬁt from just by reducing their relational
distances to them by one. Eﬃcient networks are thus expected to be more clustered than emerging
ones since the social returns to overlapping connections (i.e. forming triangles) are higher than the
17For extreme values of δ (larger but close to 0.1 or close to 1), agents have very low incentive to form triangles since,
for such values, δ.becomes very close to δ
2: the marginal beneﬁts become very low as compared to the costs of forming
such links. Thus, in these two extreme conﬁgurations, the emergent network should be the ring with a clustering equal
to 0.
14associated private returns because agents do not consider the positive externalities they generate on
other players when forming such triangles.
What do we ﬁnd? When δ ∈ [0.1,0.2], agents in emergent networks are only connected to their
two nearest geographic neighbors and clustering is null (see Figure 5). For a δ < 0.3, clustering of
both eﬃcient and emergent networks rise up to 4 or 5 times their control random networks. We also
ﬁnd (see Table 1) that for δ ∈ [0.5,0.7], eﬃcient networks are 54% more clustered than their control
random networks while the emergent networks are 34% more clustered than their own controls. When
δ increases (δ ∈ [0.7,0.85]), eﬃcient networks are still 70% more clustered while emergent ones are
13% more. When δ ∈ [0.85,0.95], eﬃcient networks are even more clustered while emergent ones are
now 45% less. Clustering of emergent networks falls down when δ becomes close to unity because
as evidenced above the private returns to such overlapping connections tend to zero. It should be
noticed that for δ ≈ 0.3, emergent networks are too much clustered. This is because agents are not
provided with suﬃcient incentives to form long distant connections for this low value of δ. (we have
seen above that agents do not generate costly shortcuts in such a case).
Proposition 6 For a large intermediary region of δ (0.2 . δ . 0.7), eﬃcient and emerging networks
are both signiﬁcantly more clustered than their control random networks. Globally, while controlling
for their density, eﬃcient networks are more clustered than emergent networks. Nevertheless, in a
narrow region of δ (0.3 . δ . 0.35), emergent networks do not generate distant connections which















































GA Efficient / Random Emergent / Random
Figure 6: The global asymetry of neighborhoods sizes (range) r(·) of GA–eﬃcient networks and
emergent networks for the various values of δ relative to the average distance of their control random
networks.
We now consider the distribution of connections over agents in the eﬃcient and the emergent
networks. The global asymmetry ratio of neighborhood sizes of eﬃcient networks is 91% while
15the global asymmetry ratio of emergent networks is only 37% (Figure 6 and Table 1). Therefore,
eﬃcient networks have a much more uneven distribution of connections than emergent networks.
Computations of local asymmetry (see Figure 7) of eﬃcient and emergent networks supports the
idea that the emergent networks have a much too balanced distribution of connections over agents18.
This statement applies for a very large region of δ: for δ higher than 0.2 and at least slightly lower than
1. The simultaneity of both geographically embedded connections and some more central agents in
the network also explains why clustering is so high in eﬃcient networks. When δ ≈ 0.9, the complete
stars tend to become the eﬃcient networks and the asymmetry ratios of eﬃcient networks become
very high. The absence of such stars in emergent networks stresses another coordination failure in
network formation: the emergent networks are much less coordinated around central agents that
contribute to increase the wealth in the population.
Proposition 7 Emergent networks have a too much balanced distribution of connections over agents.
Decentralized strategic interactions in network formation do not favor the emergence of central agents














































GA Efficient / Random Emergent / Random
Figure 7: The local asymetry of neighborhoods sizes u(·) of GA–eﬃcient networks and emergent
networks for the various values of δ relative to the average distance of their control random networks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we make a simultaneous use of two new approaches for computing emergent networks
(Monte Carlo experiments, Carayol and Roux, 2003) and eﬃcient networks (Genetic Algorithms,
18The global asymmetry is in average 37% of the one of their control random networks. The local asymmetry is 43%
of the one of control random networks.
16Carayol, Roux and Yıldızo˘ glu, 2003) in strategic network formation models. It allows us to system-
atically compare the structural properties of emergent and eﬃcient networks in a spatialized version
of the connections model which has proven to lead to emergent networks that resemble more to real
social networks (Small Words, see Carayol and Roux, 2003). Our results highlight that welfare al-
location within social networks introduces coordination failures that lead to ineﬃciency in networks
formation.
Our ﬁrst result is that emergent networks are signiﬁcantly less dense than the eﬃcient networks:
agents generate fewer connections than they should as regard social surplus because the model ex-
hibits indirect positive externalities to bond formation. Selﬁsh agents do not naturally build those
links for which the social returns overbalance the establishment costs, while the private returns do
not. Secondly, eﬃcient networks are more clustered than emergent networks: the social returns to
triangular connections are again higher than the private returns. Thirdly, agents are in average
(socially) too distant from each other and, emergent networks lack some costly distant connections,
even if this problem is reduced when the decay parameter (that conditions positive networks exter-
nalities) takes intermediary values. Lastly, emergent networks are globally and locally not enough
“coordinated”: emergent networks do not exhibit enough asymmetries between agents (the distribu-
tion of links among agents is too balanced). This should be contrasted with the eﬃcient networks,
where supplementary connections are preferentially attributed to a few agents who thus gain central
positions in the network. Emergent networks do not share this structural property because no agent
wants to bear the costs associated with such a central position, even if increasing the connectivity of
some (initially identical) agents enhances the quality of many indirect social connections.
Agents would socially beneﬁt from the compensation of some of them for internalizing networks
externalities. This would increase the local density of the network and ensure the establishment of
more costly (geographically) long distance connections that are particularly important in reducing
relational distance between agents. Agents would also be better oﬀ if some agents (or only one of
them, depending on the decay parameter) were selected and subsidized to play central roles. Global
policies could aim at subsidizing these central agents, while local policies could aim at reducing the
costs of some long distance connections. Decentralized bargaining that would lead to side payments
among agents could also contribute to achieve such a goal if agents can subsidize connections between
other agents to whom they are not directly connected (Bloch and Jackson, 2005).
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